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I would like to thank the great number of you who contacted either DGXV or the offices of the editor with constructive and supportive 
comments on the launch of the first issue of this 
newsletter. All these reactions will be taken into 
account in an attempt to reflect your interests and 
needs. 
To help to ensure the quality of the information 
is maintained, an editorial board has been set up. 
It comprises many highly qualified professionals 
with a variety of backgrounds and experience in 
the field of commercial communications. You will find them listed on 
page two of this issue. I am confident that this board will be invaluable 
in the development of Commercial Communications. 
I welcome the contributions and suggestions which have been 
made by readers. The response we have had has been extremely 
supportive. It encourages me to believe that you welcome the 
opportunity to receive information about the Commission's policy-
making in this area. 
Many of the topics which provide the context for policy development 
in the field of commercial communications will be highlighted in the 
pages of this newsletter. In particular, elsewhere in this issue I will give 
you an overview of the areas which many pinpointed as being of 
greatest concern and interest to you. This information was derived 
from the surveys conducted for DGXV earlier in the year. I hope this 
second issue will stimulate further interest and debate. 
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Editorial Comment 
We should like to apologise to readers for the delay to this second issue of Commercial Communications. It was probably inevitable that we would encounter some 
difficulties in launching the publication in three languages from the 
very start. We hope that most of the difficulties have now been 
resolved and that we can publish on a more regular basis. 
The response we have had to the first issue has been extremely 
encouraging. There are clearly many ways in which a publication 
such as this can contribute to your understanding of commercial 
communications within Europe and we shall attempt to develop an 
editorial product which reflects your principle concerns and interests. 
One of the most frequently raised issues with our office has been 
how to determine the best way to allow advertisers to develop cross-
border campaigns which are not constrained by the great number of 
regulatory differences existing between the Member States. An 
interesting insight to some of these difficulties is to be found on page 7 
of this issue where we publish a summary of the findings of the survey 
conducted by the research company BMRB International on behalf of 
DG XV and the responses to the written call for comment conducted 
by DG XV itself. 
Many argue that the best way for an acceptable basis for 
commercial communications to develop would be for a European 
self-regulatory system to be established within the framework of 
commonly accepted codes of practice. There are others, however, 
who have serious doubts about this approach and these doubts are 
expressed in this issue by a leading German lawyer. This particular 
debate will be developed in the next issue with a contribution arguing 
in favour of self-regulation from a Dutch perspective. 
There is little doubt, however, that advertising has an enormous 
economic contribution to make to the establishment and development 
of markets. This issue sees the introduction of a series of award-winning 
case histories which demonstrate the contribution advertising has made 
to the development of markets for a range of products in a number of 
Member States. We are particularly interested in covering these in 
forthcoming issues and would be glad to hear from readers who have 
suitable material for publication. 
The contribution of advertising to the development of markets has 
always been extremely difficult to determine. This issue also highlights 
the important work conducted by Professor John Philip Jones of the 
University of Syracuse who has developed a measure of advertising's 
short-term effects. The technique he describes has been made available 
in the German market recently, with plans for the principle to be 
developed in a number of other Member States in the near future. 
We are in the process of putting together an Editorial Board for 
Commercial Communications and want to take this opportunity to 
thank those who have already agreed to take time to help contribute 
to the development of the publication. It needs to be stressed that 
their involvement is purely advisory and that the views expressed in 
the pages of the publication are not necessarily those shared by the 
Board. 
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Rules for Marketing* 
in Europe 
Peter Schotthofer 
Director 
European Advertising 
lawyers Association 
* The views expressed are those of the author 
0 ne aim of setting up the Euro-pean single market has been to improve its citizens' economic 
well-being and strengthen its economy at 
both national and international level. The 
Community institutions are seeking to 
find the best and quickest means of 
achieving that objective. Among the most 
important is the establishment of com-
mon ground rules for business. 
The following example is typical of 
those often quoted in Germany in an at-
tempt to ridicule what is regarded as the 
Brussels bureaucracy's mania for regula-
tion . The Brussels bureaucrats allegedly 
had nothing better to do than to concern 
themselves with roll-over bars for tractors. 
A Directive laying down the appropriate 
requirements was duly adopted, so that 
tractor manufacturers would be able to 
sell their products in the other Member 
States, where regulations sometimes dif-
fered. The Directive provided the only 
means of ensuring that vehicles which 
satisfied the requirements could actually 
be sold anywhere in the EU by any firm 
based in a Member State. Such measures 
are often scoffed at, even by those who 
had a hand in their adoption. One might 
consider, for example, the position of the 
Bavarian Government. This has on occa-
sion launched particularly virulent attacks 
against regulation mania, but was the 
government which initiated the Directive 
on roll-over bars. 
So, before discussing marketing in 
Europe we need, in my view, to ask 
whether or not it is sensible and benefi-
cial - both for the adve1tising industry and 
for members of the public - to establish 
uniform ground rules in Europe. Only if 
the answer to this is 'yes' do we then need 
to look at the most appropriate way of 
achieving that objective. 
The fact that the Member States have 
signed the EC Treaty and are also bound 
by Article B of the Union Treaty already 
demonstrates that they agree on the need 
for such ground rules. But there are also 
quite simple economic reasons for doing 
so: the larger the market, the greater the 
sales potential; the less pronounced the 
differences (including legislative differ-
ences), the fiercer the competition. 
Uniform ground rules not only mean 
considerable cost savings for the advertis-
ing indust1y, but also create a climate of 
legal certainty for business decisions. 
Admittedly, the EC Treaty already 
confers rights that are intended to guaran-
tee the unrestricted flow of goods across 
national borders within the EU. The list of 
basic rights safeguards fundamental 
freedoms, while Article 30 prohibits 
quantitative restrictions on imports of 
goods and 'measures having equivalent 
effect', with the European Court of Justice 
acting as the guardian of these provisions. 
In addition , the country-of-origin 
principle enshrined in Article 30 ensures 
that a firm based in any Member State 
may sell its goods throughout the EU pro-
vided that it conducts its business in ac-
cordance with the laws in force in the 
Member State where it is based. 
This principle is undoubtedly useful 
and necessary, but I feel that it should 
serve only as a back-stop 
rule for cases not ( or not It is becoming impossible to yet) covered by common 
rules, since the multiplicity determine the basic legal re-
of legislative solutions has quirements for a Europe-wide 
resulted in an unmanage-
able fragmentation of the advertising campaign 
law. It is becoming impos-
sible to determine the basic legal require-
ments for a Europe-wide advertising 
campaign. Let us look at how the principle 
works in a specific case. 
Country A imposes no legal restric-
tions on a particular method of advertising 
so that firms based there may advertise 
without restriction in country B, where 
the method in question is banned. How-
3 
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ever, firms based in country B have to 
comply with the national ban, the upshot 
being discrimination by country B against 
its own firms. Sooner or later the legisla-
ture in country B has to bow to pressure 
from the public and the firms affected and 
either lift the ban completely or at least in 
part. 
Developments in connection with 
Article 6(e) of the German Law Prohibit-
ing Unfair Competition, and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice's judgment in the 
Yves Rocher case clearly demonstrate this. 
In the light of those developments and in 
advance of the judg-
... there may be as many variations ment, the German leg-
islature had already 
in the legal position .. as there are paved the way for the 
Member States repeal of Article 6(e), 
and this was indeed 
done following the Court's judgment in 
the Keck-Mithuard case. 
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We then had a situation in Germany 
where German advertisers were subject to 
the German ban on comparative price 
advertising, while firms based in Member 
States with no such ban were permitted to 
make such comparisons in their advertis-
ing in Germany. 
If taken to its logical conclusion, this 
example could result in an utterly absurd 
legal situation in country B. Firms based 
in country A do not have to comply with 
a ban in country B; those based in coun-
try C C where there is only a less stringent 
ban) need comply only with the less strin-
gent conditions this entails; and those 
based in country D need comply only 
with its own (again less rigorous) require-
ments. In theory, therefore, there may be 
as many variations in the legal position in 
country B as there are Member States. 
Although a uniform legal framework 
may eventually evolve as a result of the 
pressure on each national legislature to 
put an end to discrimination against its 
country's own firms, this is bound to take 
a long time. The decision as to whether 
the present state of affairs is acceptable, 
and how long it will remain so, rests with 
those bearing political responsibility for 
such matters - but the situation is certainly 
not satisfactory from a legal point of view. 
Against this background, I regard as 
being of secondary importance the dis-
cussion as to whether checks on compli-
ance with the country-of-origin principle 
should be carried out in that country or in 
the country of destination. However, such 
checks also presuppose that effective 
monitoring procedures have ~een set in 
place in either the country of origin or the 
country of destination. There also needs 
to be coordination between the relevant 
authorities regarding the results of checks 
carried out. But this will not counter 
charges of regulatory mania or excessive 
bureaucracy. 
Thus probably the only way of arriv-
ing at a situation that is satisfactory from 
a legal point of view is to introduce com-
mon rules and apply them uniformly in 
practice in all the Member States, i.e., by 
means of directives or regulations or by 
means of some new legal instruments still 
to be devised. This solution would have 
the added advantage of being based on 
political objectives formulated jointly by 
the institutions with a mandate to under-
take such work, rather than merely on a 
decision by a national body (or by the 
European Court of Justice) . 
Unfortunately, with its judgment in 
the Keck-Mithuard case the Court of Jus-
tice would also appear to have largely 
abandoned its role as the covert instiga-
tor of uniform ground rules. This is par-
ticularly regrettable since there are no 
political solutions in prospect. 
At this point in the discussion, the 
objection is usually raised that such uni-
form rules would not be possible anyway 
in view of the differing cultures, mentali-
ties and legal systems involved. But con-
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JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE IN 
YVES ROCHER AND KECK-MITHOUARD 
tide 30 of the EEC Treaty, which is of central importance in EU law, pro-
hibits quantitative restrictions on imports between Member States. For ex-
mple, a rule in Member State A to the effect that only a limited number 
of vehicles manufactured in Member State B may be imported into its territory 
within a specific period would be in breach of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and 
thus would be null and void. Article 30 also prohibits measures having equiva-
lent effect to quantitative restrictions. 
1 
The Court has held in various judgments that restrictions on advertising can 
be a measure having equivalent effect. More recently, the Court has measured 
a number of national restrictions on advertising against the yardstick of Article 30 
and held them to be inadmissible. 
The Yves Rocher judgment of 18 May 1993 (Case C-126/91) dealt with 
Article 6(e) of the German Law Against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen 
unlauteren Wettbewerb), which banned eye-catching advertising involving 
own-price comparisons. The French firm Yves Rocher had developed an adver-
tising method for a number of Member States and had advertised in catalogues 
using a comparison of previous (higher) and current (lower) prices to German 
customers too. 
In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Court held that the obligation on a 
trader arising from national restrictions either to use different advertising and 
sales promotion methods for individual Member States or give up a system ac-
knowledged to be effective because of national differences was an obstacle to 
imports within the meaning of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. 
However, the Court's judgment of 24 November 1993 in joined Cases 
B. Keck and D. Mithouard (C-267 / 91 and C-268/91) qualified the above 
case-law. In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 30 of 
the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect was to limit their 
commercial freedom even where such rules were not aimed at products from 
other Member States, the Court considered it necessary to re-examine and clarify 
its case-law on the matter (paragraph 14). · 
National provisions restricting certain selling arrangements were not such 
as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between 
Member States provided that those provisions applied to all affected traders. 
Thus, in future, restrictions on advertising should be assessed with reference to 
Article 30 of the EEC Treaty only if selling such products is actually made more 
difficult because of a national restriction. 
5 
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siderable progress has already been made 
- even on a voluntary basis - in introduc-
ing uniform ground rules in the form of 
common technical standards, for exam-
ple. The reason is simple: this is the only 
way of ensuring that products can actu-
ally be sold throughout Europe. 
In the field of advertising, too, there 
are good examples of uniform rules. In 
addition to the countless labelling Direc-
tives, the prime examples are the trade-
marks Directive, the introduction of a 
Community trade mark and, from a pro-
cedural angle, the piracy Regulation. 
The two Directives with a direct bear-
ing on advertising, namely the 1984 Di-
rective on misleading advertising and the 
1989 Directive on television broadcasting, 
provide the basis for establishing uniform 
ground rules. But, while the Directive on 
television broadcasting lays down more 
or less clear-cut targets (particularly in 
terms of the time-scale involved), the mis-
leading advertising Directive can be re-
garded only as a largely unsuccessful 
experiment. Although the Directive stipu-
lates that the Member States must prevent 
misleading advertising, it is silent on the 
matter of when advertising falls into this 
category. Harmonisation does not even 
Considerable progress has already 
been made ... in introducing uniform 
ground rules ... The reason is simple. 
This is the only way of ensuring that 
products can actually be sold through-
out Europe. 
need to address any differences in men-
tality at this stage, but uniform standards 
do have to be established. In Germany, 
an advertisement is regarded as mislead-
ing if 15% of the target audience is misled 
by it. The courts often commission opin-
ion polls (frequently costing between DM 
30,000 and DM 40,000) in order to ascer-
tain whether this is the case. This is not 
to say that the opinion poll should be 
used by all courts in the EU. I wish merely 
to point out that the Directive gives no in-
dication whatsoever as to how to deter-
mine whether or not an advertisement is 
misleading. 
In any case, the Directive has not es-
tablished uniform ground rules since it is 
not possible to foresee or ascertain before 
launching a Europe-wide advertising 
campaign whether - and, if so, in which 
Member States - the advertisement con-
cerned is regarded as misleading and 
hence either completely inadmissible, or 
inadmissible in its present form. 
It is a fact that - despite differing men-
talities and systems in the EU - most 
Member States hold broadly similar views 
on the content of a whole range of adver-
tisements because they regard that 
content as important for consumer pro-
tection. Most Member States have regula-
tions designed to protect consumers with 
regard to door-to-door and mail-order 
selling. The existing common ground in 
these areas could provide the starting-
point for establishing a uniform legal 
framework. 
In my opinion, it is not even a matter 
of ironing out differences in mentality, 
but rather of bringing about a meeting of 
minds on what advertising may and may 
not do and on whether the aim is to pro-
tect the average consumer or - as in Ger-
many - the casual consumer. 
Why, for example - as the Court of 
Justice asked in its ruling on the purity 
requirement - should German beer-
drinkers be better protected than their 
Belgian counterparts when they can be 
informed by means of appropriate labels 
on beer bottles? 
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Problems with Cross-
Border Commercial 
Communications -
Results of the BMRB survey 
and DG XV written Call for Comment 
ITTen trying to use commercial ommunications across borders the EU, industry frequently 
faces a regulatory maze created hy an ac-
cumulation of divergences in what are 
often very detailed national regulations. 
In particular, companies identified areas 
such as media supply, specific products 
and services and certain types of commer-
cial communications including sales 
promotions, sponsorship and direct mar-
keting as problematic. As a result, scarce 
resources need to he dedicated to legal re-
search and the adaptation of marketing 
campaigns to varying host country re-
quirements. Especially for smaller compa-
nies, these costs can he.fust too high ... 
The consultation process 
The first issue of Commercial Communi-
cations (pp. 22-24) introduced the launch 
of the consultation exercise organised by 
DG XV with interested parties on the 
problems related to cross-border com-
mercial communications in the EU. This 
issue will identify some of the most im-
portant findings 1 drawn from both the tel-
ephone/ fax survey (undertaken by the 
independent market research company 
BMRB International) and the call for writ-
ten comment, which was run by DG XV 
itself. 
The Survey 
For those companies not trading through-
out the Union, there seems to be a clear 
pecking order of markets of major signifi-
cance. Germany, France and the UK are 
of most importance to these companies, 
followed by Italy, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Belgium. 
In order to expand trading into other 
Member States, it is print advertising (89%) 
which is most heavily relied upon, with 
just over 25% of respondents using TV. 
Communication Difficulties 
Our objective in conducting the survey 
was to identify how easy or difficult com-
panies found it to undertake commercial 
communications across the Internal mar-
ket. 25% of the companies stated that it 
was 'rather' or 'very' difficult. Some 62% 
thought it 'quite' easy; few found it 'very' 
easy (9%). 
How are these difficulties character-
ised? Cultural problems were mentioned 
most often and, of these, language was 
the greatest single difficulty. When, how-
ever, respondents were asked to identify 
the single most serious difficulty they had, 
specific legal restrictions moved ahead of 
both general cultural difficulties and lan-
guage. 
Call for written comment 
Many of the more detailed replies to the 
call for written comment, which gave rise 
to over 300 submissions (representing a 
response rate of ca.13%), confirm the 
findings of the BMRB study. Companies 
identified a number of regulatory prob-
lems when using the various forms of 
commercial communications across bor-
ders in the EU (see over, Table 1). 
68 companies identified 76 areas 
where the differences in regulations be-
tween Member States were thought to 
create barriers which they classified as 
'quite', 'very' and 'extremely' serious. 
John Mogg, 
Director General, 
DGXV 
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Number of 
Type CC Number of regulatory Companies problems 
identified 
All/General 99 133 
All Advertising 56 105 
TV Advertising 52 152 
Print Advertising 13 19 
Other Advertising 13 19 
Direct Marketing 30 64 
Sales Promotions 52 132 
Sponsorship 25 41 
Packaging 24 50 
Public Relations 3 3 
Media supply 
Many companies identified problems in 
various general areas of media supply 
(aside from regulations dealing with par-
ticular product categories affecting me-
dia). These were experienced as creating 
unequal market conditions across Mem-
ber States and barriers to using particular 
practices when implementing cross-bor-
der campaigns. Areas highlighted 
included media own-
ership and licensing 
Problems arise from widery rules, cross-border 
dif.fering national policies sales bans on spill-in 
in relation to both media airtime and varying 
national airtime regu-
lations, causing avail-
able advertising time 
and creativity 
to be up to ten times as high from one 
Member State to another. Complaints 
were also voiced concerning differences 
in the treatment of dedicated shopping 
channels. 
Specific products and services 
Regulations affecting specific products or 
service sectors came up regularly in the 
replies as a major concern. For alcohol TV 
advertising for example, many companies 
pointed to differences in regulations both 
in terms of timing and content. These 
norms and regulations can go into great 
detail, specifying, for example, the age 
limits and other characteristics allowed 
for models used in commercials, the rela-
tive number of models that may drink, the 
manner in which the models are allowed 
to be shown drinking and the types of 
situations portrayed. 
One reply summarises the general 
feeling present in all others on this topic: 
'The advertising and marketing of 
alcoholic drink is controlled to a greater 
or lesser degree throughout the EU, either 
by legislation or self-regulatory code. 
Problems arise from widely differing na-
tional policies in relation to both media 
and creativity. These make cross-border 
campaigns legally hazardous, or else re-
duce them to the standards of the "most 
restrictive" country'. 
Unsurprisingly, tobacco was also 
identified as a problem area. Over-the 
counter pharmaceuticals (OTCs) and 
various health care products were men-
tioned as being controlled by a variety of 
different norms and regulations authoris-
ing or preventing certain types of com-
mercial communications for them (eg., 
prohibition of TV advertising· of OTC 
products in certain countries), stipulating 
different guidelines for content (e.g., for 
female sanitary products and concioms) 
and in certain instances imposing clear-
ance requirements. Differences in content 
regulations were also noted for commer-
cial communications for cosmetics, and 
shower and bath products. 
Regulations and codes restricting 
advertising to children and minors were 
also often quoted as differing widely 
throughout the Union. Bans on toy adver-
tising (for children under varying ages or 
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during particular time periods) or regula-
tions concerning content (e.g., the use of 
children in advertisements) or limiting 
certain forms of commercial communica-
tions aimed at children, such as sales pro-
motions, sponsorship or direct marketing, 
are all mentioned as varying significantly 
from Member State to Member State . In 
the words of one of the respondents: 
'The regulations controlling the con-
tent of TV advertising to children are 
different in all Member States. These dif-
ferences are amplified by further differ-
ences in national laws having a general 
bearing on advertising and by the exist-
ence of voluntary or statutory code based 
control systems which also differ. ' 
Similar remarks quoting specific ex-
amples were also given in the field of 
commercial communications for food-
stuffs and dietry products. 
Other product/ service areas charac-
terised by inconsistent regulatory frame-
works that were identified in the main 
concerned bans or restrictive measures 
for commercial communications by pro-
fessions (e.g., lawyers, accountants) , the 
distributive trade (eg retailers), the pub-
lishing sector and political groupings 
(e.g., environmental or human rights or-
ganisations) in certain Member States. 
Types of Commercial 
Communications 
Particular types of commercial communi-
cation also seem to be more affected than 
others. For so-called below-the-line mar-
keting communications, for example, 
many respondents pointed to the restric-
tions on the types of promotional tech-
niques allowed in certain countries. Very 
detailed specifications, concerning areas 
such as the maximum value of on-pack 
gifts or premiums, combined offers and 
the use of coupons and trading stamps 
can be completely different if not contra-
dictory between different Member States. 
To quote respondents: 
'Restrictions on the value of free gift 
items with a product ..... is a major disad-
vantage to products 
which have limited ~ considerable problem is the frag-
advertising budgets. 
This affects cross-bar- mentation of governance, with com-
der activity in that mercial communications in general 
value-added packs 
can be used in some ( and sponsorship in particular) be-
countries but not ing considered by a diverse number 
transferred · · · · of government departments in the EC 
"The rules which and in Member States .... ' 
govern the level of in-
centives or reward which one can offer a 
consumer to try a brand prohibits invest-
ment in brand development. " 
Concerning competitions and games 
of chance there are also 'widely ranging 
views as to what can and can not be em-
ployed' . Quite some techniques in this field 
are banned completely by several Mem-
ber States, whereas others are highly 
regulated. Compulsory separations be-
tween competition and purchase, lengthy 
approval mechanisms and varying entry 
mechanisms are often cited as a hin-
drance to the development of an effective 
pan-European marketing campaign. 
Direct Marketing is clearly another 
problem area for companies marketing 
across-borders in the European Union. 
Different regulations on data protection 
were mentioned most frequently as a 
source of problems. In the words of one 
company: 
'Direct Marketing: Extremely serious 
problem: Transfer of personal data (ie 
names and addresses) across borders 
within the community'. 
9 
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In the area of sponsorship, broadcast 
sponsorship was singled out most often 
as the problem area, but complaints were 
also made as to the lack of distinction 
made when drawing up regulations be-
tween broadcasting and event sponsor-
ship, despite their fundamental 
51% of the companies difference in nature. Barriers 
mentioned cover areas such as 
general differences between Mem-interviewed wanted 
some minimal common ber States, various prohibited 
approach to regulation product categories, restictions on 
sponsoring particular types of pro-
10 
grammes, regulations on sponsor 
credits, the use of logos, number of ban-
ners and brand communication during 
sponsored programmes. 
'A considerable problem is the frag-
mentation of governance) with commer-
cial communications in general (and 
sponsorship in particular) being consid-
ered by a diverse number of government 
departments in the EC and in Member 
States which means that no central re-
sponsibility or decision is taken) and 
information is difficult to establish, par-
ticularly for interested parties. ' 
'Rules ( are)so strict that they limit the 
creative scope for European campaigns.' 
Implications 
Faced with these various problems, 20% 
of respondents to the BMRB survey men-
tioned that they adapted their marketing/ 
advertising for each Member State. 14% 
organised their marketing strategy cen-
trally but implemented it locally, whereas 
12% executed their communication sepa-
rately in each country. 
Preferred action by the 
Commission 
Respondents were also asked for the type 
of help they would like to see from the 
Commission. For commercial coinmuni-
cations, 51 % of the companies inter-
viewed by BMRB wanted some minimal 
common approach to regulation. A fur-
ther 8% wanted pan-European guide-
lines . 
The issue of self-regulation recieved 
little spontaneous mention from advertis-
ers ( only 3% of respondents believed the 
Commission should rely on "effective 
self-regulation"). Most companies thought 
that they should comply with established 
arrangements in any country with which 
they were communicating. Self-regula-
tion did not appear to offer any clear ad-
vantages over legal constraints. 
In terms of information to be pro-
vided by the Commission, many respond-
ents seemed to be in need of information 
on the different national legislative/ nor-
mative frameworks and the differences 
between them. On top of this, the need 
for more information on changes in the 
European and national regulatory envi-
ronments was stressed. 
The concept of a periodic newsletter/ 
leaflet was suggested most regularly as a 
way for industry to keep up to date on 
developments. It was in view of this, and 
more generally to be able to increase 
communication between all market 
actors in the field of commercial commu-
nications, that this newsletter was con-
ceived. With your cooperation and 
comments, DGXV hopes to be able to 
focus it as precisely as possible on your 
needs. 
Only the replies of the category 
"companies using commercial communi-
cations" are dealt with in this article. The 
full results, including those of the service 
providers, the media operators, the con-
sumer organisations and the self-regula-
tory authorities will be disclosed at a later 
date. 
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The BMW Case History -
'The Ultimate Driving Machine' 
This case study won for WCRS and BMW the Grand Prix in the latest 
IPA Advertising Effectiveness Awards and the award of the title 
'Brand of the Year 1995' from the Marketing Society 
During most of the 1970's, BMWs in the UK were sold in showrooms alongside other marques known 
for their performance and rarity, such as 
Maserati and Ferrari. Annual sales aver-
aged between five and ten thousand cars 
throughout that decade, reaching a peak 
of about 13,000 in 1979. At that time , 
BMWs were positioned in consumers ' 
minds as very expensive, very fast cars 
and were being bought by a rather nar-
row group of car enthusiasts. 
In 1979, BMW decided to become a 
much bigger player in the British market. 
They replaced their concessionaire dis-
tributor with a wholly-owned subsidiary 
and set it the objective of increasing an-
nual volume sales by 300% over the next 
decade. They indicated this had to be 
achieved without sacrificing high profit 
margins. 
It was at this time that WCRS in Lon-
don was appointed to develop an adver-
tising strategy to help the new company 
achieve its tough business objectives. Be-
fore long it was agreed that the two pri-
mary tasks of the advertising were: 
First: to extend the appeal of the 
BMW brand beyond the dedicated enthu-
siast currently buying the cars. To do this, 
we would need to create a more rounded 
brand image with values more people 
could buy into. Without this, the huge in-
crease in sales could not be achieved. 
Secondly: while making the brand 
more popular, to ensure that the exclusiv-
ity currently associated with the cars was 
not compromised. This was to help pre-
serve the high profit margins. 
On the basis that there is very often 
an inverse relationship between exclusiv-
ity and ubiquity, achieving both these 
objectives was going to be a challenge. 
The advertising strategy that contin-
ues to reconcile these apparently mutu-
ally exclusive objectives is based on four 
fundamentals: first, the consistent corn-
munication of core brand values; second, 
the use of the 'sniper' strategy; third, ad-
herence to the centre of gravity concept; 
and finally, the creation of a unique BMW 
tone of voice. These terms require a brief 
explanation. 
Core brand values 
Early research showed that people chose 
to buy into the BMW brand before decid-
ing on a particular model. Hence, creat-
ing a clear identity for the brand was 
critical. This was done by establishing the 
core BMW brand values and then com-
municating them consistently. 
Consumer research, ruthless interro-
gation of the product and in-depth dis-
cussions with people from all parts of the 
BMW business helped identify four core 
brand values: advanced technology, per-
formance, quality and exclusivity. 
Since 1979, these values have helped 
shape all BMW communications. How-
ever, in order to keep the campaign fresh 
and relevant to changing market condi-
tions their expression has been evolved 
over time. 
For instance , where once perform-
ance was about sheer grunt and accelera-
tion, it is now expressed in a more 
'responsible' way for the 1990s. Here, ac-
celeration is linked to safety and, there-
fore, is more in tune with the values of 
today's motorist. However, the perform-
Case History 
Joel Levy 
Director 
WCRS 
Performance is now 
measured in a more 
'responsible' way 
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ance message is still very clear. 
Likewise, as the quality of all cars has 
improved exponentially since the early 
'80s, BMW's expression of quality has 
evolved from 'cars which are well made' 
to 'quality which permeates everything 
BMW do', right the way down to how 
BMW train their technicians . This finds 
expression in ads that talk about the rig-
orous training programme all BMW tech-
nicians must complete before they can 
earn the BMW Master Technician Award. 
Similarly, the expression of advanced 
technology has moved from the examples 
of 'the latest in technology' to the most rel-
evant and purposeful technology. 
When there weren't many BMWs 
about, exclusivity could be expressed in 
terms of rarity. But physical rarity as a way 
of expressing exclusivity has become in-
creasingly untenable as more and more 
BMWs have taken to Britain's roads. In-
deed, the number of BMWs on Britain's 
roads today is fast approaching 500,000. 
Hence, exclusivity has now come to 
mean 'value not available elsewhere' -
i.e., 'only BMW could make a car like 
this'. 
It has been this evolution that has 
helped keep the BMW brand relevant and 
desirable. And it is because of this that the 
brand was able to take full advantage of 
Raising the brand's centre of gravity 
o/o of model 
sales 
58% 
o/o of advertising 
spend 
32% 
12% 
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the '80s economic boom - when it be-
came the icon of the yuppie generation -
and still retain very healthy sales through 
the recent recession and the conequent 
dramatic change in the social landscape. 
The 'sniper' strategy. 
The second element of the advertising 
strategy has been what we call the 'sniper 
strategy'. By this we mean the use of re-
search to segment BMW's audiences and 
the use of highly targeted media to com-
municate the core brand values in a way 
most relevant to each group. For instance, 
advertising for the 3 Series might focus on 
quality for older buyers, and performance 
for younger drivers . 
The guiding principle in the creation 
of our advertising has always been that 
our cars are not mass produced so nor 
should the advertising be. So, by develop-
ing and executing over 20 individual col-
our press advertisements every year we 
have been able to demonstrate each of 
our core brand values in the knowledge 
that not all of our advertisements would 
appeal to everyone, but that the sum of 
the parts would be infinitely larger than 
the whole. Moreover, it has been impor-
tant that no single advertisement would 
be seen on average more than, say, once 
or twice by anyone - avoiding the percep-
tion of mass produced advertising aimed 
at everyone. 
Raising the BMW brand's 
centre of gravity 
The third component in the strategy was 
raising the brand's centre of gravity. 
The BMW brand, at last count, com-
prised 84 models. The difference in price 
and performance between the top and 
bottom of the range is £57,000 and 260 
bhp respectively. The strategy has always 
been to use the top end models to raise 
the centre - i.e. the average perception -
of the brand higher. 
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In essence , this is a compensatory 
mechanism to prevent the decay in icon 
status that sales expansion would other-
wise create. 
In practice, this has meant allocating 
advertising and marketing spend dispro-
portionately behind the top end models. 
Hence, as you can see from Figure 1, 
in a typical non-launch year - 1990 - the 7 
and 8 Series, which together represented 
only 8% of sales, received not far off 50% 
of BMW's advertising spend; whereas 
only 22% of the budget went on the 3 
Series, even though it accounted for 58% 
of sales. 
This is of great benefit to both the 
brand and the less expensive models in 
the range. The person who buys a 3 Se-
ries feels he is also buying some of the 
magic of the 5 and 7. Indeed, BMW ad-
vertising has consistently highlighted the 
similarities between its more and less ex-
pensive cars. 
Consistent tone of voice 
The final pillar in the strategy is a consist-
ent tone of voice that immediately identi-
fies an ad as BMW's. This consistency has 
been achieved by creating a clear vision 
and blueprint for what we call the 'BMW 
world'. It is a world that evolves, but not 
so much that you would notice it in one 
ad to the next. The evolution is virtually 
seamless. 
The BMW world is a cool, calculated, 
precise place. You will seldom see people 
in this world because people , unlike 
BMWs, are fallible. The car is always cen-
tral to the ad. And the ad is always based 
on a fact about the car that helps express 
the core values of the BMW brand. 
In a BMW ad there is nothing that is 
not central to the creative idea; and any 
object, location, or colour that is included 
is chosen only after considering the ques-
tion: if it were a BMW, what would it look 
like? This question has proved immensely 
useful in ensuring that 
the same 'tonal calibra-
tion', consistent with the 
BMW brand personality, 
is achieved with each and 
every ad. 
Cons ider two ver-
sions of the same ad to 
illustrate this . One ver-
sion, with its dirty con-
crete floor, scattering of 
garden and DIY equip-
ment failed the test - too 
much evidence of hu-
n1ans and their fallibility. 
Now consider another 
rendition of the same ENOUGHSAID. 
idea. The spotless, pre- j 
cisely balanced world $ 
depicted in this second ···-····~~,,,,,l;·'\~···,.·:,:"'"'-';:'""''·'·O:: "·"~::.:C~~:.. "::;;·4r~,".~.· .·:,::::1·-.:.,:-;:·.~ ·•0~·.,,;t~"":.,: ;,,·,.::....-.... 
version is the BMW world. The car stands 
out as a cool technical icon. This, as you 
might expect, is the only version that ever 
saw the light of day. 
Assessing the campaign's 
effectiveness 
To find out whether this strategy was suc-
cessful, we need to start with the business 
objectives. 
Figure 2 shows how not only have 
the sales tripled, but so has market share. 
Indeed, at the moment, sales of BMWs 
Figure 2 
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are up approximately 30% year to date in 
a market showing a 1 % decline. Impor-
tantly, this growth has been achieved 
whilst retaining high profit margins. BMW 
dealers achieve higher margins than all 
other major manufacturers. And BMW has 
made a profit every year since 1980. 
However, this is only circumstantial 
evidence - hardly enough on its own. It 
was through a Sherlock Holmes-style 
process of elimination that this associa-
tion could be demonstrated to be no ac-
cident. 
Like any investigation, the first step 
was to examine and, if possible, eliminate 
the factors other than advertising that 
might be responsible. It was this process 
that showed that price, product and dis-
tribution could not account for the level 
of success observed over the period and 
that it was the enriched imagery of the 
BMW brand created by the advertising 
that could. 
Price considerations 
One way to gain volume is to lower 
prices. However, the price of BMWs - as 
was the case for all German cars - rose 
consistently during the period as the 
Deutschmark relentlessly gained ground 
over Sterling. Indeed, in the UK the aver-
age price of a BMW remained well ahead 
Figure 3 
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of the market, even rising during the re-
cession. 
Importantly, the average price level of 
a BMW was not being driven up by sell-
ing proportionately more of the more ex-
pensive models in the range. Quite the 
contrary. 
From 1980 onwards, BMW sold more 
and more of its least expensive models as 
a proportion of total sales. In 1980, 48% 
of the sales mix was accounted for by the 
3 Series and by 1993 71 %. 
It is clear that the sales success was 
not due to lower prices. Indeed, BMW 
prices rose more than the market, despite 
selling proportionately fewer expensive 
models in the range. 
Distribution factors 
Though the quality of BMW dealerships 
certainly improved, their actual number 
only increased slightly, going from 143 in 
1980 to 157 in 1994. 
What did increase substantially was 
the rate of sale per dealer. In the early '80s 
BMW's rate of sale lagged behind the rest 
of the market, whereas now they lead the 
market, reflecting the ever growing de-
mand for BMW cars. 
So, while sales increased 300%, dealer-
ships only increased by 10%. Clearly, the 
sales success cannot be accounted for by 
distribution. 
Product improvements 
That leaves product. Did sales increase 
threefold because of better products? 
Certainly the products improved, but 
no more than in any of BMW's other Eu-
ropean markets. And if we look at BMW's 
performance in key European markets 
(Figure 3) we see that sales in France and 
Germany were up only 50% and sales in 
Italy stayed pretty much constant from 
1980 to 1993. 
In the process, BMW in the UK moved 
from being the fourth biggest seller of 
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BMW s in Europe to second, just behind 
Germany - with the same products. So it 
is clear that improved products cannot ac-
count for the level of sales achieved. Af-
ter all, the same products sold better in 
the UK than elsewhere. 
This analysis eliminated probable ex-
planations for the success achieved. The 
question remained, what was responsible 
for the success? 
The factors that explain success 
There are two things that distinguish 
BMW in the UK from BMW anywhere 
else. First, its levels of sales success and, 
second, the stature of the brand in the 
minds of consumers. The reality of BMWs 
in the UK is that there are plenty of them 
about. Exclusivity in the sense of actual 
rarity they clearly do not possess. Since 
1980 the number of BMWs on Britain's 
roads has increased roughly 6-fold. Yet, in 
the minds of consumers, BMW remains 
an exclusive, highly desirable brand. 
Indeed, BMW is, perhaps, the strong-
est car brand in the UK. In image terms it 
is more highly regarded than any other 
marque including Mercedes. 
The findings from BMW's image 
tracking study (Figure 4) show the brand's 
lead over its most direct competitors on a 
host of key attributes - engineering prow-
ess, safety, innovative technology, style, 
environmental friendliness and sheer 
driving pleasure. 
Moreover, findings from international 
image tracking shows that the UK is the 
only market in which BMW is more 
highly regarded than Mercedes. The data 
are derived from 18 product and image 
statements. When compared to Germany, 
France and Italy, it is only in Britain 
where BMW's image out-performs that of 
Mercedes. 
What makes BMW stronger in the UK 
is the greater depth consumers ascribe to 
the brand. Everywhere the BMW is known 
as more sporty than Mercedes but only in 
the UK does BMW perform more strongly 
than its rival on other attributes as well. 
This more rounded image is not due to 
selling different cars in Britain. BMW's 
sales profile is pretty much the same across 
Europe, with the exception of Germany 
where more top-end models are sold. 
If we look at BMW's image over the 
longer term, the improvements become 
even more apparent. A comparison of 
BMW's image in the UK, France, Ger-
many and Italy indexed against the 
Figure 4 
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-' brand's image in Germany in 1979 and in 
1993 is a useful guide, as almost invariably 
a brand's image is strongest in its home 
market. 
In 1979 BMW in the UK had weaker 
imagery than in Germany, but by 1992 
Britain had at least matched Germany. This 
is in contrast to the imagery of the brand 
in France and Italy where, relatively, it 
weakened against the home market. 
The strength of the brand in the UK is 
further evidenced by tracking study data, 
which show how motorists respond 
when asked which car they would be 
most likely to choose next time - a good 
measure of the car's desirability. 
BMW comes second only to Vauxhall 
"Green" Rewarding 
to drive 
15 
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Incidently, at the time this research was 
conducted, Vauxhall sat on roughly 17% 
market share; that is, its desirability was in 
line with its market position. BMW's mar-
ket share was just under 3%, though 11 % 
stated it was likely to be their next car. 
In addition, the strength of consumer 
demand and the premium the brand de-
livers has made BMW the most sought-
after dealership in the country. Asked to 
rate the value of their franchise out of ten 
by the Retail Motor Industry Federation, 
BMW dealers in the UK stood out signifi-
cantly in their rating of their franchise ver-
sus competitive dealers' ratings of their 
franchises. 
Rather than price, distribution and 
developments in the product, it is the 
strength of the brand that has created 
quite exceptional levels of demand and 
regard for BMW in the UK. The brand has 
achieved the depth of meaning and 
breadth of appeal originally established 
as a key task for advertising. In short, 15 
years of consistent advertising has been 
critical in building the BMW brand. 
One benefi~ of such consistency is 
that the advertising itself becomes well 
known. Though typically BMW ranks 
about eighth in terms of advertising 
spend, it is not uncommon for it to rank 
at least third in advertising awareness. Its 
·awareness ranking has always been 
higher than its spend ranking. 
But the major benefit of consistency is 
that the consumer has developed a clear 
understanding of what the BMW brand 
stands for. Consumers now have an un-
derstanding of what is BMW's mission: 
that is, a determination to make the best 
cars through innovative technology, an 
emphasis on performance and an unsur-
passed level of attention to detail in the 
pursuit of quality. In research, no other 
major manufacturer comes across as be-
ing so dedicated to the art of making 
really desirable cars . Indeed, BMW's 
brand vision and its public image are truly 
aligned. 
The commercial value of building 
the BMW brand 
But what value can we attach to this in-
vestment in brand building advertising? 
Two empirical methods were em-
ployed to put a commercial value on the 
advertising. The first was to suppose that 
BMW sales had grown at the same rate 
from 1980 to 1993; the other was to sup-
pose sales had grown at the same rate as 
BMW in other European markets over 
that same period. 
The first method takes out the effect 
of the recession in the UK which would 
mask the value of BMW's extra sales. The 
second method establishes what sales 
would have been if BMW had only grown 
at the same rate as it did in Germany, 
France and Italy. 
In the first, the incremental sales rep-
resent something like £2.7bn. 
In the second, the incremental sales 
represent something like £3 .2bn. 
In both scenarios sales of BMW s 
would have been a lot less than was the 
case - approximately 200,000 cars fewer. 
And BMW would have made a lot less 
money, some £3bn less. On an advertis-
ing investment of £91m, this represents a 
pretty good return. 
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ECONOMIC CLIMATE 
AND BRANDS: 
Consumer Attitudes to Brands, 
Promotions and Pricing 
For the first time since the 1950s, European consumers have felt the influence of recession for 
more than three successive years. We 
do not have any experience in 
predicting how the economy may 
perform when consumer spending has 
been under pressure for this length of 
time. 
What are the consequences for 
brands? These appear to have lost a 
great deal of credibility. 
Crumbling authorities 
Our society is going through some 
radical changes which will have a 
pervasive influence on all Western 
economies. 
With a series of tracking studies, 
Gates has been looking since 1993 into 
the consumer climate, monitoring 
changing consumer reactions and 
assessing what the implications the 
depressed economic climate has for 
brands. The results of the November 
1994 survey showed that 83% of 
Belgian consumers had negative 
attitudes towards the current economic 
climate. 54% expected the recession to 
last a further five years, while 32% 
were convinced that it would last still 
longer. Three out of four Belgians felt 
the impact of the recession directly, in 
their wallets. 
This general feeling of uncertainty 
is expressed also in the crumbling of 
respect for authorities and the 
disappearance of past certainties. 
The end to the communist era will 
have an enormous impact on our 
economic system. Cheap natural 
resources and cheap labour will 
penetrate our markets. The bulk of our 
economic activity is shifting from 
heavy industry to the so-called brain-
power industries, i.e. the high-
technology industries, the development 
of which seems unlimited. 
However, the young, highly 
educated generation of Asia is ready to 
take over. The globalisation of our 
markets has led to cheaper import 
prices,. cheaper labour and, in the end, 
cheaper consumption prices. 
We live in a period of deflation and 
the U.S. economy is no longer able to 
influence world markets as it used to. 
Sharper competition on the world 
market has led to much more 
competitive prices, and brands have 
lost much of their former credibility. 
Crumbling brand authority 
The attitude expressed by consumers 
is, 'Why spend on a brand name if the 
company makes a store brand which is 
20% cheaper?' Consumers feel cheated. 
They have heard too often 'new, new, 
new' and have bought too many 
spurious diversifications and incoherent 
line-extensions. They have seen too 
many superficial lifestyle ads. 
Brands have become too complex 
in too short a time. They have lost their 
guidance function for the consumer 
and are no longer staking out their 
territo1y clearly. 
Whilst their income is depressed, 
consumers seek to save money. What 
strategies do they employ? There seem 
to be three major tactics. Most simply 
buy less often (69%), while two out of 
three consumers buy cheaper brands 
and 45% buy smaller quantities per 
purchase. 
We have noticed a weakening 
brand loyalty for commodities and the 
highest brand disloyalty is to be found 
amongst daily 'pleasure' products. 
While numbers of loyal brand 
buyers used to average 80% for dairy 
products and 60% for snacks, by 
November 1994 this had slipped to 
61 % and 33% respectively. Disloyalty 
scores ranged from 25% for dairy and 
up to 50% for desserts. 
Lucienne Hellebosch 
Director General 
GATES Marketing 
Crumbling brand image 
Familiarity with a brand is built on 
exposure to the brand, both through 
advertising and usage. When frequency 
of usage decreases, advertising has to 
increase in order to maintain the levels 
of awareness. 
When exposure to the cheaper 
brands increases, the price elasticity for 
the most expensive brands decreases. 
The psychologically accepted price 
premium for an A-brand decreases 
most in those product categories where 
store brands are most active. The 
consumer is no longer willing to pay 
higher prices for brand labels. 
Back to core values 
The change in attitudes towards 
brands will provoke marketing to 
review the significance of their brands 
to their target group. 
Brands need to go back to their 
basic function for the consumer, as 
beacons helping consumers to find 
their way through a sea of products. 
The recession has made price a 
valued means of orientation. The 
Belgian consumer has now experienced 
the feeling 'I am king, for I have the 
money sought after by distributors and 
manufacturers. ' High quality, low price 
and service are essential to the 
consumer. Some extra, unexpected 
service may Hnk them to a brand. 
Continuity in the promise offered and 
the special relationship with brands is 
needed to recreate the values the 
consumers expect C and want) brands 
to have. 
The recession of the 1990s will have 
a long-term effect on the Belgian 
consumer of a magnitude similar to 
that of the oil crisis and the Korean 
War. The effect will be mainly on 
attitudes to spending and consumer 
attitudes and expectations of brands. 
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The Challenge of the 
I-Bahn 
Ad driven TV or 
Pay driven TV? 
Recent technological progress has opened our eyes to the possibility of an awesome brave new world of 
electronic media by enabling the conver-
gence of the telephone, the computer and 
the television. 
There is no apparent limit to growth. 
Multimedia markets could be enormous. 
North America caught the I-Bahn fever 
first, then Europe, and now the Japanese. 
The Japanese may have been slow to see 
the I-Bahn, but they have caught the fe-
ver as acutely as any other nationality. 
Thus, a paper published last year by the 
Multimedia Promotion Association, an af-
filiate organisation of the Japanese Minis-
try of International Trade and Industry, 
valued the Japanese multimedia market at 
Yen 223 billion ($2.17 billion) in 1993, 
and predicted that it would grow by more 
than a hundredfold to Yen 40-50 trillion 
($388.4-485.4 billion) per annum by 2015. 
The figures are staggering, though it 
is necessary to qualify them. The increase 
is partly a matter of definition, since mul-
timedia growth is as much, if not more, 
about the joining together of markets, 
which are treated as separate now (e.g., 
merging of television entertainment with 
telecommunications and computing), as it 
is about the creation of new market oppor-
tunities (e.g., video-on-demand or VOD). 
Television entertainment, as we un-
derstand it today, will occupy a fairly 
small segment of the total multimedia 
market. This does not imply that viewing 
levels will suffer because of all the new 
and competing uses of the TV screen. 
Certain applications, such as videogames, 
may squeeze viewing levels because they 
compete with television programming as 
entertainment. In general, though, the 
main revenue possibilities are for non-en-
tertainment services such as home-shop-
ping, electronic mailing or home-banking, 
Dr. Toby Syfret, 
Media Consultant 
which will presumably be offered as effi-
cient, time-saving alternatives to current 
practice. That being the case, there are 
grounds for predicting that, far from caus-
ing people to view television programmes 
less, the trends of multimedia conver-
gence and growth will enable them to 
spend more time watching TV. 
The questions are, how will pro-
grammes be offered to viewers, and how 
will they be paid for? The promise of inter-
active VOD technologies is that viewers 
will no longer have to watch broadcast 
channels, but can call up any program-
ming they choose; in which case, might 
they not prefer to pay instead of having to 
watch advertising? 
There are those who think that this 
will indeed happen. An example of the 
extremist position is this excerpt from 
George Gilder, which appeared in The 
Economist in 1993. According to his view: 
'Television and telephone systems -
designed for a world in which spectrum 
or bandwidth was scarce - are utterly un-
suited for a world in which bandwidth is 
abundant.' 
'Whether offering 500 channels or 
thousands, television will be irrelevant in 
a world, where you can always order ex-
actly what you want when you want it, 
and every terminal commands the power 
of a television station today.' 
It is hard to see what position brand 
advertising can hold on to in the kind of 
world that George Gilder describes. 
The potential and limits 
for paid-for- TV 
/ 
By 'paid-for-TV' is meant television serv-
ices that are paid for directly and volun-
tarily. The alternative, 'free TV', embraces 
television services supported by advertis-
ing or the obligatory licence fee. Of 
course, free TV, whether supported by 
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advertising or the licence fee, also costs 
the viewer money. The essential distinc-
tion is that free TV does not allow for any 
discretionary payment, and free services 
are available at no extra charge to anyone 
who possesses the necessary apparatus 
for receiving their signals. 
Paid-for-TV comes in two main forms 
today: (a) basic and premium subscrip-
tion services ('subscription TV'), includ-
ing pay-per-view, which exists on a very 
small scale; (b) rental and purchasing of 
video software. 
This article concentrates mainly on 
the subscription services, and argues that 
it does not have the potential to replace 
free TV. It presents a valuable and · seg-
mented market opportunity in its own 
right. However, there are distinct limits to 
how much money the public is prepared 
to spend on paid-for-TV, or on what 
kinds of programming it is prepared to 
pay for. 
The first point to acknowledge is that 
subscription TV already makes a large 
contribution towards funding television. 
As Table 1 reveals, about $33 billion will 
have been spent on subscription TV 
across the biggest television markets in 
the world. This compares with about $80 
billion spent on television advertising. 
These are gross figures. For estimat-
ing net channel revenues, it is necessary 
to subtract cable operator and DTH sub-
scriber management income from the 
subscription figures and likewise media 
commission from the advertising figures. 
At a guess, 1994 net channel revenues 
from subscription TV services will work 
out at some $15-20 billion compared with 
about $70 billion from advertising. 
Both subscription TV and advertising 
TV are growing fast in some countries, es-
pecially in the Asia/Pacific region and 
parts of South America. In Western Eu-
rope, television advertising markets are 
mostly closer to maturity, but some sub-
Table 1 
World Markets for Subscription and Advertising TV 
Adv. Sub. Adv. Sub. Total 
Shr. Shr. Rev. Rev. 
Region % % $ bn $ bn $ bn 
Africa/Middle East 71.6 29.4 0.63 0.25 0.88 
Americas 66.3 23.7 41.21 20.96 62.17 
Asia/Pacific 87.3 12.7 19.8 2.89 22.69 
Europe 67.7 22.3 18.78 8.97 27.75 
TOTAL 70.9 29.1 80.42 33.06 113.48 
Source: 1995 TBI Yearbook. Countries are included on the criterion that 
forecast 1994 gross television spend will be close to, or exceed, $100 m. 
scription markets are continuing to ex-
pand rapidly. By contrast, advertising and 
subscription TV are relatively mature in 
the USA, which accounts for well over half 
the total world revenues from subscription 
TV according to my 1994 estimates. Yet, 
$17 billion spent on subscription TV in the 
USA contrasts with the $33 billion that 
Zenith forecast for TV advertising. Other 
sources suggest a lower figure of around 
$30 billion in TV advertising spend. Only 
by factoring in a further $13 billion for 
pre-recorded video can we say that the 
total paid-for-TV market in the USA is 
about equal in size to the television ad-
vertising market. 
Hence, my second proposition: Sub-
scription TV, or Paid-for-TV (i.e., includ-
ing video software rental and sales), has 
to grow far beyond its present size even 
in the USA if it is to replace spot advertis-
ing on the 1-Bahns of the future. 
However, it is unlikely to do so be-
cause there are clear limits to what the 
public will pay for subscription TV (I 
shall deal with video later on). 
Basic subscription services: With rare 
exceptions, such as the UK, cable is much 
the most important vehicle for delivering 
subscription TV. European figures in Ta-
ble 2 show price to be a major determi-
nant of subscriber density: meaning, 
homes connected to cable as a propor-
tion of homes passed. Other factors (e.g., 
quality of off-air reception, attractions of 
extra channels, connection charges, costs 
of construction, etc.) also matter; how-
ever, price is probably the most impor-
tant. As a rule, cable penetration and 
subscriber density are high/ very high in 
countries where it is treated as a semi-
public utility, which is charged for at a low 
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Table 2 
Trade-off between subscription fees, cable 
penetration and subscriber density in Europe 
Spain 
Cable Subscriber Ave. 
Penetration Density Monthly Fee 
% 
95 
% 
97 
% 
87.2 93.7 
57 
45.9 
36.2 
26 
3 
5.3 
1.1 
93.5 
92.9 
86 
75.2 
72 
65.6 
59.7 3.6 
56 15.05 
20.8 17.93 
. 19.1 24.52 
--------
14. 1 12.55 
monthly rate, and 
much lower where it 
is treated as a com-
mercial profit-mak-
ing enterprise, which 
is charged for at a 
significantly higher 
monthly rate. 
Premium Pay TV: 
* Ireland: Cable penetration figures are for the end of 1993. Later 
figures include MMDS. 
By contrast with basic 
subscription services, 
elements of the pub-
lic will pay large sums 
of money for access 
to premium pay TV 
services, of which 
Source: Kagan World Media: European Cable/Pay TV Databook 
- I 995. Cable penetration and subscription density figures are 
1994 end of year estimates. Monthly subscription fees are average 
year estimates for 1994. 
Table 3 
Penetration of premium Pay TV Channels 
the core attractions 
are inv-ariably films and 
sports. Again, there is abun-
dant evidence for price 
sensitivity with regard to 
the take-up of premium 
channels. Even more im-
portant, however, the mar-
ket is highly segmented. 
Table 3 shows recent grow-
ing trends of pay TV in the 
larger European markets, 
and, for comparison, the 
USA, Canada,Japan, and 
South Africa. South Africa 
has been selected because it 
is equal with France as the 
world's largest pay TV mar-
ket after the USA. 
End of year penetration - % 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 
France 14 15 16 18 
Germany * 1 2 2 
Italy 0 0 2 
Netherlands 2 2 2 3 
Spain 0 0 5 6 
Sweden 8 11 12 12 
UK 3 7 11 14 
Canada 11 11 12 13 
Japan 0 2 3 4 
South Africa 15 16 17 18 
USA 29 29 28 28 
Source: TBI, JWT, Kagan World Media 
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Three points need to 
be made: 
•There is not a single national market 
outside the USA where the national pen-
etration of premium pay TV services ex-
ceeds 20%. Although Table 3 does not 
show it, there is some evidence of slack-
ening growth trends in the other leading 
countries, such as France, South Africa, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the 
case of France, Canal+ accounted for 
almost all pay TV penetration in 1993. 
Launched in November 1984, it experi-
enced its first-ever half-yearly drop in 
subscriber numbers, from 3.708 million 
subscribers at the beginning of January to 
3.677 million subscribers at the beginning 
of July. 
• Not even in the USA has the pen-
etration of premium pay TV services 
exceeded 30%. At the same time, the es-
pecially high levels of pay TV penetration 
found there reflect a combination of spe-
cial and favourable circumstances. Chief 
among them, I suggest, are: (a) the very 
high levels of advertising clutter on free 
TV; (b) the relatively low monthly charges 
(about $12 per premium channel on top 
of basic cable subscriptions); and (c) the 
fact of the USA's being by far the world's 
largest home-producer of ficti01:ial enter-
tainment, including feature films. 
• Outside the USA, a range of factors 
determines whether countries are good or 
bad markets for pay TV. If 20% or there-
abouts represents the ceiling for the lead-
ing countries, others may not get near it 
simply because interest levels are lower. 
Several observers have suggested that the 
main reason why pay TV penetration is 
low in Germany and the Netherlands is 
because viewers can tune into an abun-
dance of feature films and top quality 
sports on the free channels. Whatever the 
reason, interest levels are certainly lower 
in those countries. This is graphically il-
lustrated by self-completion data from the 
November 1992 PETAR (Pan European 
Television Audience Research) survey, 
sponsored by MTV Europe. Table 4 
shows the sizeable differences in levels of 
pay TV penetration and interest levels 
that were found, based on a sample of 
about 1,800 respondents. 
Price may be an important determi-
nant of interest in premium pay TV chan-
nels; however, the crucial point to retain 
when considering the potential ofVOD is 
that the market for premium pay TV serv-
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ices is segmented. Table 5 illustrates this. 
Once more the data are from PETAR but, 
this time, from the November 1993 sur-
vey, with a self-completion sample of 
about 1,650 adults. 
The PETAR November 1993 findings, 
which replicated the findings of the No-
vember 1992 PETAR survey, found that 
subscribers were no different from the 
rest in considering price the main disad-
vantage, and in general were as alert to 
the negatives as the rest of the sample: 
however, the point of real difference be-
tween them and the rest was their degree 
of enthusiasm for the products offered by 
premium film channels. They were simply 
significantly more enthusiastic about films. 
The November 1993 PETAR illustrates 
one further point: namely, the concept of 
subscription TV is still much less widely 
accepted in Northern Europe than fund-
ing by the licence fee or advertising. Re-
spondents were asked for their approval/ 
disapproval of each method of funding 
on a five point scale. Table 6 summarizes 
their answers. 
In conclusion: 
• The global market for subscription 
TV is already substantial and growing. 
• However, it has a very long way to 
go before it catches up with advertising. 
• Nor is it likely to catch up with ad-
vertising. In the USA, which is both a rela-
tively mature and favourable market for 
subscription TV, total subscription rev-
enues of around $17 billion in 1994 
amount to little over half the $30+ billion 
expected to accrue from advertising. 
Only by adding an additional $13 billion 
for video purchase and rental, do we ob-
tain rough parity between advertising and 
total paid-for-TV revenues. 
• Outside the USA, the market po-
tential for subscription TV generally ap-
pears significantly lower. Both basic and 
premium subscription services show 
themselves to be highly price sensitive. 
Table 4 
Interest in premium Pay TV 
Belgium (Flanders) 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Swed::n 
Already 
Suh,cribe 
% 
4 
11 
10 
6 
3 
18 
Interested in Total 
Subscribing 
% % 
21 25 
10 21 
9 19 
9 15 
J) 23 
17 3.5 
• In addition, (a) the 
market for premium sub-
scription services, of which 
the core attractions are films 
and sports , is highly seg-
mented, and (b) evidence 
Source: PETAR, November 1992 
from Northern Europe suggests that the 
concept of voluntary payment for receiv-
ing TV channels is still much less widely 
accepted than the licence fee or advertis-
ing revenue. 
Will the future be any different? 
But, some will object, the arguments and 
the evidence I have mustered relate to 
conventional pay TV services, and 
are irrelevant when 
it comes to the Table 5 
I-Bahn, where the Pros and Cons of Premium Film Channels 
whole emphasis will 
shift from subscrip-
tion to payment on 
demand. 
Of course, current 
experience of con-
ventional subscription 
services cannot tell us 
exactly what will hap-
pen on the I-Bahn, 
but it does offer clues 
about viewer interest, 
price elasticity and 
revenue potential, 
which are worth pay-
ing attention to. Let us 
consider now what 
the future adds. 
The main con-
sumer propositions 
of paid-for-TV on 
the I-Bahn are pay-
per-view (PPV), near-
video-on-demand 
(NVOD), and video-
on-demand (VOD), 
plus a few interac-
tive services, such as 
Attraction of premium 
film channels 
Whole 
Sample 
% 
Films without ads 32 
Wider choice of films 26 
Newer films 24 
Better films 21 
More convenient than the 20 
cmema 
Repeats 13 
No special attractions 51 
Negatives of premium 
film channels 
Cost of subscription 62 
Need for a decoder 3 9 
Enough on the other 30 
channels 
Too many repeats 17 
Can see on video/at the 12 
cinema 
Video rental is better 12 
value 
No disadvantages 6 
Source: PETAR, November 1993 
Premium 
Pay TV 
Subscribers 
21 
% 
67 
56 
50 
46 
56 
56 
4 
62 
54 
14 
27 
5 
11 
9 
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Table 6 
How should TV be paid for? 
Pro 
In the Middle 
Con 
Don't know/ 
No answer 
Table 7 
Licence Fee 
% 
51 
24 
19 
6 
Advertising 
% 
43 
22 
27 
8 
Subs./Pay 
% 
16 
28 
42 
14 
video games and 
home shopping, in-
habiting the fringes 
of TV entertainment. 
Of these, PPV 
is not new in North 
America, although the first European PPV 
service (Multivision in France) was only 
recently launched in May 1994 . Indeed, 
in North America, it has a history which 
goes back further than pay TV, with Cana-
da's Videotron having launched PPV serv-
ices as long ago as 1967. Canadian PPV 
services are still in the red. Neither in 
Canada nor in the USA has PPV proved a 
success. In the USA, for example, average 
annual earnings per subscriber for PPV 
services was $50 in 1993, less than a third 
of the annual revenue yield for conven-
tional pay TV channels such as HBO. So, 
how might this change on the I-Bahn? 
There are three ways in which the 
I-Bahn can help PPV. First, through the 
development of lower cost addressable 
systems. Second, through the improve-
ment of the interactive return path, 
whereby the viewer can use his remote 
control, as opposed to the telephone, to 
order a PPV offering. This enables 'im-
pulse PPV'. And third, through granting 
many, many more digital channels, which 
Interactive Multimedia services - application preference 
Application Ranking* Application Preference** 
First Choice Second Choice 
VOD 35 3 38 
Information Services 5 7 19 
Educational Services 2 8 26 
Home Shopping 14 30 
Transaction services 1 II 23 
Games 0 24 
* Based on number of respondents selecting applications as first/second choice. 
** Based on number of respondents selecting 'highly likely to use application'. 
Source: HK Telecom Strategic Planning: Table reproduced from TBI 1995 Yearbook. 
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will enable PPV operators to greatly ex-
pand their offerings. US experience sug-
gests that PPV take-up rates may increase 
severalfold when these conditions obtain. 
But, we need to be cautious. To date, 
the core attractions of PPV seem to be 
precisely the same as for pay TV and 
video: namely, films and sports, with ar-
guably an added (and therefore nar- · 
rower) emphasis on bigness and novelty 
(i.e., recent release for films and 'live' 
sports events). Indeed, PPV has arguably 
less to do with extending choice, than of-
fering greater convenience. We must 
therefore ask whether the gains of I-Bahn 
PPV will not simply cannibalise other rev-
enue streams, which include conven-
tional premium pay TV, video rental (and 
purchase), and box office receipts at the 
cinema. 
And, it is necessary to recognize that 
not all the past constraints on PPV are at-
tributable to Ice Age technology. PPV has 
fared poorly in North America at least 
partly because of the limits to what people 
will pay for it. It attracted a great deal of 
interest in the USA during the early '80s 
when cable growth was at its peak. 
'By 1983', writes Timothy Hollins in 
'Beyond Broadcasting:Into The Cable 
Age', 'there had been ten pay-per-view 
events nationally distributed, including 
the heavyweight boxing championship 
fight between Larry Holmes and Jerry 
Cooney in June 1982, live rock concerts 
by the Rolling Stones and The Who, and 
the films, Star Wars and The Pirates of 
Penzance. Prices per subscriber ranged 
from $10 up to $30. Early evidence 
seemed to augur well: the Holmes/ 
Cooney fight attracted almost half the 
potential subscribers and earned some $9 
million. Several systems discovered that 
subscribers made such occasions into 
television parties, with Warner Amex es-
timating an average nine people per tel-
evision set for the Leonard Hearns title 
.... continued on page 29 
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John Philip Jones 
Advertising 
accountability 
Measuring advertising's 
effectiveness Professor of Communications University of Syracuse 
W:at does accountability mean? It means, in essence, that the eff--ctiveness of advertising has to 
be measurable. There are many surrogate 
psychological measures and we also have 
some behavioural or sales measures. The 
surrogate measures cover things like 
brand awareness and attitudes to brands; 
brand image attributes and advertising 
recall and recognition and attitudes to 
advertising.There are very many research 
services that measure variables of this 
sort. 
The behavioural measures are more 
problematic and more difficult. We can 
look at share of market/ share of voice 
relationships and I have done some work 
on this myself. Over the years there has 
been a great deal of econometric analysis, 
statistical modelling and the calculation of 
advertising elasticities and I will refer to 
these below. But we now have something 
that is really much simpler and, I believe, 
much better. This is single-source scanner 
data, which forms the basis for the rest of 
this article. 
I would like to nail my colours to the 
mast and I am not going to budge from 
this statement. Surrogates provide useful 
diagnostics, but surrogate measures on 
their own are totally inadequate. If we are 
going to have to demonstrate advertis-
ing's viability, we are going to have to 
have more than surrogate measures. 
Consider how advertising is evalu-
ated: before exposure we test concepts 
and we test finished ads; and (in theory) 
we test short-term sales effects and surro-
gates for sales effects, and long-term sales 
effects and surrogates for long-term sales 
effects. We do an awful lot of measure-
ment of these surrogate effects, particu-
larly in the United States, where there is 
a vast industry in quantitative copy test-
ing. We do a great deal of long-term sales 
measurement. But, oddly enough, we do 
very little short-term sales measurement, 
which is strange, and that is what I want 
to concentrate on. Is it possible to detect 
any short-term effect from advertising? 
Many people say 'No!' I think they are all 
wrong. 
Advertising's short-term effects 
The difficulty or traditional difficulty of 
tracking the short-term sales effectiveness 
of advertising has really caused the adver-
tising industry almost to surrender the keys 
to the castle. Many have contributed to this 
surrender and here is just one example. 
These are the words of a person for whom 
I have tremendous respect, David Ogilvy: 
'Every advertisement should be thought of 
as a contribution to the complex symbol 
which is the brand image. If you take that 
long view, a great many day-to-day prob-
lems solve themselves'. I don't disagree 
with that, but unfortunately,when we look 
at the long view, we tend to forget the 
short view. After all, in the long term we 
are all dead! 
Take again a well-known research or-
ganisation which says this: 'A convincing 
set of conclusions can be reached by tak-
ing together modelled sales data and the 
results of tracking study questions .. .. . If the 
trend sales suggest that the campaign is 
working, this is surely a much more prob-
able conclusion if it was also well recalled, 
communicated clearly and shifted brand 
attitudes.' 
I have to say, if I were an advertiser 
and all the advertising industry could of-
fer me was 'if the trend sales suggest that 
the campaign is working', I would spend 
all my money below the line too. But, I 
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Chart 2 
Chart 1 
Annual sales of brands XA and XB index 
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believe the research industry can actually 
do something a little more robust, a little 
more heroic than that. 
The problem is, of course, that the tra-
ditional ways of tracking sales were done 
over relatively long periods, so any short-
term movement was concealed. We are 
all familiar with the methods we used to 
use when employing Nielsen data, and I 
am deliberately using data from the 1970s 
when we relied on these types of data. 
Chart 1 looks at two major brands in the 
US in a very important category, and here 
we plainly see a tremendous smoothness. 
Weekly Sales of Brand (Sales in First Week =100) 
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Weeks 
Obviously, with this year-by-year data we 
see no short-term effects. At the end of 
five years, however, we do see a differ-
ence in those brands and ask whether this 
is related to long-term advertising effects? 
And it was related to a long-term adver-
tising effect, being a question really of 
budgetary policy, and this can be tracked 
perfectly easily. 
But what has happened to the short-
term effect? When we see these data we 
conclude there aren 't any short-term 
effects and that any effects are in the long-
term. When we looked at the bi-monthly 
Nielsen data for the brands we saw beau-
tiful seasonal movements. We saw two 
months by two months regularly repeating 
patterns and, year-by-year, we saw sea-
sonal drops from peak to trough, never 
more than 30%. If we try to look at the ef-
fect of marketing stimuli, sometimes we 
see some effect from a promotion if that 
promotion was very heavy, but we hardly 
ever see any advertising effects. So we 
think to ourselves, since the best research 
we have can't show any effect from adver-
tising, advertising can't have any effect. 
Adve1tising must be something to do with 
long-term brand images and all those 
other things that David Ogilvy talks about. 
When we actually started to track 
sales on a more realistic basis, week by 
week or even day by day, something else 
started popping out of the data. Chart 2 
looks at one year, for a fairly major US 
brand, using week-by-week data. We had 
never seen such a degree of volatility. The 
drop from peak to trough isn't 30%, it is 
over 60%, and there are hardly two weeks 
that have the same sales level. This is typi-
cal of literally hundreds of cases we have 
seen in the US and the same is pretty 
much true of many categories in Europe. 
What has driven these ups? Well, 
three things have driven them - first of all 
they have been driven by the promotions 
of the brand; secondly, advertising for the 
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brand, and thirdly, seasonal factors. In 
turn, the downs have resulted from the 
promotions for competitive brands in the 
category; advertising for competitive 
brands in the category and seasonal 
downturns. 
Single-source research 
How can we track the effect, in particular, 
of the advertising? We have to use single-
source research. What we mean by single-
source is that we capture, within the indi-
vidual household, the important variables. 
I am going to describe what I call pure sin-
gle-source research as originally conceived 
by Colin McDonald: the capturing and in-
ter-relating of three streams of data. We 
have to measure in detail and reliably the 
household purchasing of named brands 
and varieties; secondly, we have to capture 
the television viewing within the house-
hold in terms of channels and when the set 
is switched on to each channel; thirdly, 
and this is a real problem in the US be-
cause of the huge fragmentation of the tel-
evision audience, we have got to be able 
to locate what commercials are on the air. 
The average household sees 40 chan-
nels, which are dense with commercials, 
so there is considerable difficulty in attrib-
uting particular times to particular com-
mercials. The only way that Nielsen has 
managed to do it, and I'm drawing in this 
article on Nielsen data, is by having some-
thing called Monitor Plus, which has a sat-
ellite monitoring service that tracks all the 
commercials in the largest Designated 
Marketing Areas (DMAs) in the country. 
They log something like 2.5 million com-
mercials every month and it is a very com-
plex procedure. 
Difficult though it is, it can be done. 
Many of the problems highlighted over a 
decade of experimentation have been re-
solved. But it is important to keep in mind 
what has been learnt. The more we 
disaggregate- a key point- the more we 
Chart 3 
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Purchase 
2 
0 
break down into little cells, the more we 
learn; and the more we aggregate the 
, more we conceal. 
I have developed a device called the 
Short Term Advertising Strengths test 
(STAS). Originally I worked on one cat-
egory, looking at packaged detergents, 
but only at 12 brands and I couldn't really 
generalise too much from that. We are 
talking about a national sample of 2,000 
households and in the pilot work I 
looked at 7,500 purchase occasions. 
The national work I have now com-
pleted is based on 110,000 purchase oc-
casions and has great statistical solidity. 
We have week by week mechanised data 
collection, the result of a very serious up-
front investment. 40,000 homes in the 
United States have the hand-held scan-
ners that collect the purchasing data. 
These devices get the UPC (Unique Prod-
uct Code); the housewife punches in the 
price; and at the end of the week, the 
housewife dials an 800 or cost free tel-
ephone number, presses the back of the 
machine into the mouthpiece and all the 
information is downloaded to Nielsen. 
The STAS is worked out in the follow-
ing way. Chart 3 looks at a fairly major 
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Chart 4 
236 
Chart 5 
182 
26 
f.m.c.g. brand in packaging terms. It is a 
Procter brand. The 3% share of market 
without advertising I call the baseline 
STAS. It is the brand's share of purchase 
occasions in the households which have 
not received television advertising for it 
during the seven days before purchase. As 
a result of advertising, at least one adver-
tisement for the brand during the seven 
days before purchase - very robust, very 
clear - the STAS goes up to 4.8. The STAS 
differential is 1.8% on 3%, which is a 60% 
lift or increase as a result of the advertising. 
This is a major advertising effect, not a 
promotional effect. The STAS differential is 
a measure of sales response within seven 
Range of STAS Effects 
73 
Range of Long-Term Sales Changes 
69 
days of adve1tising. It is a temporary thing. 
It may go down in the next week as peo-
ple respond to the STAS of other brands, 
but it is repetitious in that the original STAS 
effect can repeat itself over the course of a 
year. If there are more ups than downs we 
are on a slightly rising trend, and I'll return 
to the long-term effects shortly. But there 
is one very important point of principle 
here. The STAS is a precondition for a 
long-term effect. (Those people who urge 
that if there is no short-term effect, simply 
spend a few more million dollars and a 
long term-effect will come should be 
treated with some scepticism). 
The STAS differential can be either 
positive or negative. Advertising can ac-
tually reduce sales. It doesn't mean that it 
unsells the brand, it simply means that the 
campaign is not strong enough to protect 
the brand from the STAS of competitive 
brands. It is a measure, very clearly, of 
creative effect. 
There is also a long-term effect. 
I measure this by the sales response over 
a 3-12 month period. The strength of the 
STAS differential does affect the matter. 
The stronger the short-term effect, the 
greater the thrust to push the long-term 
effect forward, but it is not the only thing. 
There is also the tremendous influence of 
media continuity, the fact that you need 
to try to avoid breaks in the schedule. 
And finally, there is what I call the inter-
nal momentum of the brand, which is a 
little different from the much discussed 
brand equity. 
Internal momentum has got a fo1ward 
thrust to it. Internal momentum actually 
can grow and it can go down. The stronger 
brands have got a very strong internal 
momentum. My sample, by the way, al-
though it is based on a huge number of 
purchase occasions, was of 78 brands and 
I shouldn't really percentage these. If you 
will forgive the statistical solecism, 70% of 
those campaigns had a short-term effect. 
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A lot of the effect is very small, but 70% did 
have a positive short-term effect and 46% 
had a short- and long-term effect. This 
meant in fact that the difference, 24per-
centage points, had a short-term effect and 
no long-term effect. A lot of the effect was 
lost, and I would suggest that this was 
really because of deficient media continu-
ity. Too much is spent on concentration, 
without enough continuity. 
I made an analysis of all the brands in 
a range. I did a decile analysis and broke 
the whole thing into units of 10 across the 
whole range of effects. Look at the high 
end response (Chart 4). How many 
would imagine that advertising could do 
that? One sees a terrific short term effect. 
Compare this with the long term effect 
(Chart 5). Here we have the same scale, 
but much more muted. But even the top 
decile has a very strong effect and the 
importance is in differentiating between 
the short- and the long-term effect. If we 
can isolate what the STAS differential is, 
and we don't get a long-term effect, we 
can look for the causes. In most cases it 
is a deficiency in media continuity, which 
is the point I am going to conclude with. 
There are two further issues I need to 
touch upon briefly. One of these concerns 
response functions and we are all familiar 
with diagrams like Chart 6. On the left, the 
horizontal line looks at doses of advertis-
ing and then looks at the sales generated. 
As we can see by the configuration of the 
diagram on the left, the first ad produced 
a lot of sales, the second ad produced 
more sales but not quite as many, and the 
third one still fewer. Of course, that is the 
classic pattern of diminishing returns. It is 
the standard direct response pattern and it 
has always been thus. This, of course, 
argues for media dispersion, for media 
continuity and not too great a degree of 
concentration. If you concentrate a lot, the 
consequence will be diminishing returns 
very quickly. 
Chart 6 
Advertising Response Functions 
Advertising Advl"rtisi ng 
The diagram on the right represents 
the theoretical background for the univer-
sal American media buying policy of ef-
fective frequency 'flighting'. Here, the first 
dose of advertising produces a number of 
sales, the second one a bit more and third 
one a bit more, until we reach the balance 
or inflection point. But this argues that we 
should be putting our money into suffi-
cient concentration to reach this point. 
Normally in the US this is interpreted as 
three insertions within a notional period 
which is assumed to be the purchase in-
terval, but in practice is normally three in-
sertions in a month 
The question of course, which is a 
fairly hot debate and has been for 20 
years in the United States, is which of 
Chart 7 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
The Effect of One Advertisement 
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Advertising 
Price 
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these models is generally applicable? 
This sort of analysis depends, except for 
direct response where it is easy to meas-
ure the results, on rather complex model 
building. I personally tracked 19 exam-
ples of either effect, but the actual reliabil-
ity of the models varies a certain amount. 
Single source makes it much easier. 
Here we can count the sales in the seven 
days before purchasing from any amount 
of advertising and we can count the sales 
in the seven days before purchasing 
when people have seen one ad. We can 
clearly see how much difference one ad 
has made. What emerges may be a sim-
ple little picture, but it is full of problems 
for the American media buyer. Chart 7 
shows the average of all my 78 brands 
and here the average overall STAS is up 
from 7.6 to 8.7. However, 8.4 is from one 
exposure; in other words, on average 75% 
of sales comes from one exposure and 
there isn't an exception. Every single 
brand follows the same trend. It demon-
strates totally unambiguously that dimin-
ishing returns is the name of the game. 
Already, in media buying circles in the 
United States, I am not going to say the 
cat, but rather the man-devouring leopard 
is among the pigeons! It will be very in-
teresting to see what happens over the 
next few months. 
When I talked before about model 
building, I really want to look at both ad-
vertising and promotional effects. When 
we try to isolate these, again by economet-
Published Averages 
- Short-Term Effect 
0.2 
-1. 8 
Av. of Alpha Brands 
- Long Term Effect 
1.6 
-6 
ric methods, we come to the conclusion 
that the adrenalin effect of advertising is 
really quite small. The average of 130 cases 
is an advertising elasticity of something 
like 0.2. That means, very simply, that on 
average a 1 % boost in advertising budget 
will generate an increase of 0.2% in sales. 
It seems small but is sometimes profitable, 
not always but sometimes. 
The needle doesn't swing very far in 
sales terms. When we look at promotions 
of course we see a huge effect. The nee-
dle swings to an extreme degree. On av-
erage, looking at promotional price 
reductions, we see an elasticity co-effi-
cient of -1.8, that is to say the 1 % reduc-
tion in price will on average cause the 
sales to go up by 1.8%, a huge increase. 
But of course in most cases that is unprof-
itable volume, so actually making less 
profit from the larger amount of volume 
sales on promotion than from the smaller 
amount sold without promotion. 
So, it is costing you an arm and a leg 
to do this sort of thing although you are 
getting big sales results. Now, what we 
haven't looked at is what happens if do 
both things together. What happens if we 
have strong promotions and strong adver-
tising in line together. Well I managed to 
do an analysis from my Nielsen data and 
Table 1 highlights what comes out. 
This is really very interesting I think. 
Advertising in isolation from promotions 
yields this small elasticity of 0.2. If promo-
tions are alongside, the effect of adver-
tising is increased by a factor of 8. If we 
look at promotions in isolation we get an 
elasticity of -1.8, but again, if we add on 
advertising we get an increase by a factor 
of 3, so there is an enormous synergy at 
work. This is the strongest argument, of 
course, for the buzz word in American 
marketing, IMC, 'Integrated Marketing 
Communication ' and everybody talks 
about it in their presentations and confer-
ences, but unfortunately, nobody does it! 
Commercial Communications December 1995 Information Society 
fight in September 1991.. .. Subsequent 
events, however, have not been so fa-
vourable, and subscriber levels have 
dropped down to and even below the 
economic minimum for system operators, 
whose marketing expenses on such occa-
sions are very considerable.' 
The author concludes: 
'For the system operators the lessons 
at present seem to be that special pay-per-
view events need to be chosen carefully 
and marketed intensively. As one-off 
events each needs considerable promo-
tion, which in the case of addressable sys-
tems must be continued right up to the 
moment they are shown in order to cap-
ture the impulse viewer. Such events also 
need the broadest appeal and cannot be 
put too closely together.' 
Do not be fooled. When Murdoch 
and friends buy their hundred digital 
channels on Astra 1 d et seq. in order to 
offer PPV and NVOD, they must still work 
hard to make profits. In the case of 
NVOD, the consumer attractions are not 
even clear, though why not bung down 
loads of staggered channels, 'and screw 
up audience measurement for the adver-
tiser when digital bandwidth comes so 
cheap? Meanwhile, fifty PPV channels of 
top releases offers rather less choice than 
the average video store. 
But then, PPV and NVOD only pre-
pare the way for the ultimate in viewer 
choice and convenience: VOD. A number 
of VOD trials are currently in progress in 
the USA and other parts of the world, and 
word has it that the early results are en-
couraging. Furthermore, various pieces of 
consumer research testify to the appeal of 
the VOD concept, such as a 1995 study by 
Hong Kong Telecom (Table 7). 
The results from Hong Kong echo US 
survey results. 
The concept of VOD evidently strikes 
a happy chord with the public compared 
with other adornments of the I-Bahn, but 
Table 8 
% US respondents interested in 
interactive services by type 
On-demand movies or TV 
programmes 
Educational children's shows 
Travel reservations and information 
TV gameshows 
Sports events 
Electronic mail 
Video games 
Shopping services on music channels 
On-line services 
% Expressing 
an interest 
55.4 
47.7 
40.4 
32.7 
31.1 
26.9 
26 
25.4 
24.8 
Source: Advertising Age 1993; table reproduced from TBI 
1995 Yearbook 
there is no cause for exuberance. 
• At least half the public does not 
express interest in VOD, and that is be-
fore the other half has had the opportu-
nity to experience the sweet sting of 
purchasing on demand. Moreover, some 
relatively popular on-demand services, 
such as education, will compete against 
television programming for share of 
purse. 
• The results from various pieces of 
research once more point to the primacy 
of feature films and sports as the main 
attractions of VOD. Once more we must 
ask, to what extent will VOD merely can-
nibalise alternative revenue streams from 
conventional pay-TV, pre-recorded video 
rental and purchase, and the cinema? 
Early results from US trials suggest that 
pre-recorded video rental, which is now 
most frequently rated as the most enjoy-
able way to watch movies according to a 
survey by the Electronics Industry Asso-
ciation in the USA, could be most vulner-
able to the encroachment of VOD. This is 
ironic as the much vaunted Denver con-
sumer trials by TCI have mimicked VOD 
servers with banks of VCRs, video libraries 
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Table 9 
US studio revenues from feature films 
Share of 
revenues 
% 
Home video 50.2 
Cinema rental 25.7 
Television 10.5 
Pay-TV 7.7 
Videodiscs 4.2 
PPV l 
Other 0.7 
Total 1994 revenues projected at about $16 billion 
Source: Goldman Sachs Estimates, 1994 
and human on-demand fetchers and ma-
chine feeders. 
• If indeed the extra promise of VOD 
is largely at the expense of video rentals, 
then we must expect a relatively high 
price for the cannibalization. For, as Ta-
ble 9 shows, the rental and purchase of 
video software is now the main revenue 
stream of the major US studios, account-
ing for a surprising 50% of domestic and 
overseas income. Surprising, that is , if we 
consider that video probably accounts for 
less than 10% of the au-
diences for their prod-
The rental and purchase of video uct. The point is that 
video is a highly lucra-
tive revenue stream for 
the rights holders. So, 
whilst the cable arm of 
Time Warner Inc. lauds 
software is now the main revenue 
stream of the major US studios, 
accountingfor 50% of domestic 
and overseas income 
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the potential of VOD, 
beware that other less 
vocal divisions of Time 
Inc. may take a different view. For them 
to retain their profit margins, VOD is un-
likely to come cheap; especially with all 
the associated costs of developing the 
necessary infrastructure of VOD servers. 
Even supposing VOD to be a smash 
hit with the public, it is likely to take years 
to develop on account of such factors as: 
• National laws constraining growth; 
• Investment required by both serv-
ice providers and the public for the devel-
opment of the network infrastructure; 
• Acquiescence preceded by negotia-
tions between would-be service providers 
and the rights holders; 
• Development of 'smart agents' to 
navigate viewers through the bewildering 
brave new world of choice. According to 
Barry Diller at the 1994 International TV 
Conference in Edinburgh, 'I think smart 
agents are going to be the single most 
important mechanism for empowering 
the entire industry. It will finally make 
mass media fit the individual.'; 
• Development of alternative mecha-
nisms of publicity to advertise programmes 
which no longer appear on mass TV. 
In summary: 
• The future will differ most from the 
present in the sense that choice and con-
venience will be greater. 
• However, the actual product and 
the main attractions (films and sports) will 
remain much the same but for some 
extra opportunities of 'customization' 
thanks to the interactive facilities of the I-
Bahn. 
• This ought to warn us against antici-
pating very much higher levels of spend 
on paid-for-TV in the age of VOD com-
pared with the current potential of sub-
scription TV plus home video and cinema. 
• When it arrives, VOD will not enter 
a vacuum but must compete for its place 
in the sun against established alternative 
services and revenue streams. In the case 
of home video, it is important to recog-
nize the very high profit margins that it 
delivers the holders of programming 
rights. For VOD to replace video, they 
(the rights holders) must be satisfied that 
they will profit further from the exchange. 
Granted the likely costs of establishing 
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the necessary infrastructure for offering 
VOD, it is questionable whether VOD will 
be as cheap as video rental. If so, this will 
inhibit its growth. 
• In short, PPV, NVOD and VOD, may 
well augment paid-for-TV revenues by a 
sufficiently large margin to entice compa-
nies like Time Warner, Canal+ or BSkyB. 
However, there is nothing to suggest that 
the financial promise of paid-for-TV is so 
great that it will enable the market players 
to dispense with adve1tising. 
• Nor is there any contradiction in 
positing a mixed economy of 'Me TV', 
where the viewer programmes his own 
channel, and 'free TV' supported by ad-
vertising and the licence fee. This is 
because the cost per hour viewed of paid-
for-TV is very much higher - say, up to ten 
times higher, or higher still - than the cost 
of free TV. As a result, even were paid-for-
TV to yield twice the annual revenues of 
advertising and the licence fee in Europe, 
it would still leave more than 80% of the 
audience share open to free channels. 
Hence it is that I reject the vision of 
the future projected by George Gilder, 
and incline more to that put forward by 
Rupert Murdoch at NATPE 1993. On the 
one hand, he says: 
'Even here in the US, television is on 
an exponential growth curve. This year -
not a decade from now, but this year - our 
friends at TCI will inaugurate digital com-
pression. Within four years, 90% of their 
subscribers will be connected to fibre-rich 
networks boasting 500 or more channels. ' 
On the other hand, he also says: 
'I love cable. Cable has helped us tre-
mendously, and we aspire to be a leading 
software supplier to the cable industry. 
But I believe - more strongly than any-
thing else I believe - in the primacy of 
mass circulation media, and that means 
broadcast television.' 
And when will the future arrive? 
And so finally to the question of timing. 
When will we get the I-Bahn in Europe? 
Almost any answer is bound to be 
misleading. In a sense, the I-Bahn is al-
ready here all around us. It is a simple 
matter to join the Internet or Compuserve 
and send correspondence via E-mail. If I 
then said, as I guess, that it will take at 
least ten years before more than 10% of 
Europeans enjoy 500 fibre-rich or fibre-
free channel ea pacity, depending on 
which delive1y medium they use, the an-
swer sounds like nothing. But if I said 
that, as a result of recent developments, 
today's Buick has more computing power 
than the entire Apollo project, which 
landed three men on the moon in 1969, 
or that the fax, which grew from nothing 
into a dominant form of business corre-
spondence during the '80s, could become 
a relic of the past within five years, the 
tide of progress begins to sound more 
impressive. 
Without question, the I-Bahn is an 
impending reality. The critical question is 
less how many viewers will receive an 
unlimited supply of channels in the next 
ten to twenty years than the development 
of services . Powerful groups like Kirch, 
Bertelsmann and News International are 
poised to launch a vast number of digital 
channels. Granted the constraints on mar-
ket growth and the realities of paid-for-TV 
already mentioned, it is hard to imagine 
that on-demand services will account for 
more than 1 % audience share inside ten 
years; but even at 1 % we are talking of an 
on-demand market worth several billion 
dollars per annum. 
The I-Bahn will offer much more of 
concern and interest to the advertiser 
than unlimited channel capacity ready to 
serve on-demand programmes. On the 
fringe of television programming, it prom-
ises new opportunities in home shop-
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The 1-&hn nuiy be 
able to show the 
customer anything 
virtually, but it 
cannot deliver a 
canofbeans 
32 
ping. But there is a snag. Up to now, main 
developments on the I-Bahn have lain 
with telecommunications services, such 
as E-mail. When it comes to virtual shop-
ping malls, the I-Bahn can only work if 
the malls are supported by additional vi-
able retail and distribution services. They 
present an enormous and distinct issue 
from the I-Bahn itself. Put another way, 
the I-Bahn may be able to show the cus-
tomer anything virtually, but it cannot 
deliver a can of beans. 
It is very easy to forget the complex-
ity of services. When everyone got ex-
cited about cable development in the USA 
during the early '80s, one of the stock in-
teractive ideas for cable use was home se-
curity. It seemed so simple. Just plug a 
burglar alarm system into the cable return 
path, and link it with the local police sta-
tion - no sweat. In practice , however, it 
was nothing like so easy or sound an idea, 
as Timothy Hollins once more tells us. 
'The one interactive service that is un-
doubtedly on the verge of becoming a 
profitable and fully commercial business 
in the United States is the emergency 
alarm system .... 
'Cable companies ... should be able to 
offer a cheaper service because they do 
not pay high phone-line tariffs. By offer-
ing installation charges at or below cost 
they can undercut conventional alarm 
systems, while in most cases offering a 
superior service .... 
'Cable security is still a young busi-
ness and early systems have had serious 
technical problems. Indeed, many have 
had to use telephone lines for the return 
signal until the problems can be solved. 
False alarms caused by anything from sig-
nal noise to ants crawling into sensors are 
an inevitable concern and have led to 
some reluctance on the part of police and 
fire officials to support devices which 
might make enormous extra demands on 
their manpower.' 
And so on. 
As for home shopping, it is wo1th re-
membering that there is still much to 
commend the simplicity of old-fashioned 
well established return paths for ordering 
goods, such as the telephone and pencil 
on paper messages left by the front door. 
The fact that home delivery shopping 
services have declined so much in coun-
tries like the United Kingdom in recent 
years should alert us to the challenges of 
establishing viable virtual shopping malls . 
The failure to appreciate the complex-
ity of services may be one of the reasons 
why so many advocates for the electronic 
culture have consistently over-egged the 
pace of change. Thus, for example, al-
most every single published forecast over 
the last fifteen years of cable and/ or 
DTH growth in the United Kingdom has 
proved over-optimistic, and sometimes 
wildly so even within a year or two of 
publication. And what better oracle to 
quote than an official government source; 
in this instance, Kenneth Baker, former 
Minister of Information and Technology. 
'By the end of the decade multi-chan-
nel cable television will be commonplace. 
In-home country-wide TV will be used 
for armchair shopping, banking, calling 
emergency services and many other serv-
ices. ' 
Kenneth Baker managed to omit MP 
surgeries as one of the thousand and one 
useful services on the I-Bahn. But what 
we also need to recall is that he spoke his 
fateful words in 1982, and almost nothing 
of his fine visions had come to pass by 
1990. On the other hand, even he may 
have been amazed by the colossal gains 
in computing power and flexibility of tel-
ecommunications that occurred during 
the '80s, and which will in the not so dis-
tant future enable the public to supple-
ment its fare of free, here-and-now-TV 
with on-demand paid-for-TV entertain-
ment of whatever sort. 
